new two-layer model. Two distinctly different processes, the different requests and the system call sequence in the same request section, are classified as two layers and dealt with by different Markov chains respectively. The two-layer frame can depict the dynamic activity of the protected process more exactly than the single layer frame, so that the two-layer detection model can promote the detection rate and degrade the false alarm rate. Furthermore, the detected anomaly will be limited in the corresponding request sections where anomaly happens. The new detection model is suitable for privileged processes, especially for those based on request-response.
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is one that identifies intrusions, where an intrusion is defined as a misuse
by an authorized user or as an unauthorized use by external adversaries [1, 2] . An intrusion detection classification appears in Ref. [3] . There are two general methods for detecting intrusions: anomaly detection and pattern recognition. Our detection method belongs to the former. The audit data used in our detection model are system call traces. A system call trace is an ordered sequence of system calls, which a process performs during execution. The system calls in the trace depend on the execution path of the process. A process execution path depends on many factors such as the inputs and the states of the system. These factors determine what execution path a process takes at each passable branch point. Therefore, the inputs to process are important data for constructing normal profiles and detecting anomaly. The parameters and return values of call are often ignored in anomaly detection system that operates on system call traces [4−8] . In 1996, Forrest and others first introduced a simple intrusion detection method, which is based on monitoring the system calls of the privileged processes [6] . Her work shows that a normal process behavior could be characterized by local patterns in its traces, and deviations from these patterns could be used to identify security violations of an executing process. Over the past several years, many statistical learning techniques in IDS have been developed. Several of these methods have the potential for generating more accurate and (or) more compact models based on the system call trace data [4−8] . Warrender [7] wrote a survey on the intrusion detection methods based on system calls. Markov chain is a powerful tool of anomaly detection [9−15] . A high order Markov chain detection model appears in Ref. [10] , but the computation and memory are too expensive.
Our detection model differs from the above research studies. On the one hand, above methods, which operate on system traces, only use call names as audit data, but ignore call parameters and return values. This factor may bring false alarm and false negation. In our detection model, requests/commands which are the kernel inputs to process and appear in the call parameters, are used to denote the states into which the process enters, and the call return value is also used. In fact, this means that the dynamic activity of process depends on not only code but also current input. On the other hand, above methods, which use Markov chain to detect anomaly regard the call trace as a whole. As illustrated in this paper, we view the call trace of process as being composed of two-layer Markov chains. This refined description to call trace will contribute to a more accurate intrusion detection.
The outline of the paper is as follow. The definition of intrusion detection that operates on system call trace is given in section 1. Section 2 provides a general outline of the traditional Markov chain anomaly detections. Section 3 describes two-layer Markov chain anomaly intrusion detections. We then describe a wu-ftpd detection prototype and experimental results in Section 4. Discussion is given in section 5. Future work and concluding remarks are provided in section 6.
Definition of Intrusion Detection System That Operates on Call Traces
An application can be viewed as a function f which takes the current application state s t and input i t as parameters, and returns the output o t and next state s t+1 [16] : 
Traditional Marko Chain Anomaly Detection Technique
The traditional first-order Markov model of event (call) transitions assumes that the next event depends on only the last event in the past. Let M t be the value of a random variable or the state of a system at time t. A Markov chain is a stochastic process with the following assumptions [13, 14] : [11, 15, 16] , where q i is the probability of the system in state i at time 0, and , .The probability of sequence M
. In the Markov chain detection model, the normal profiles are matrix P and vector Q. They can be learned from the historic data of the system's normal behavior: p of observations. After learning normal profiles, the anomaly detection is to observe the window of size k on the continuous steam of audit for viewing the last k audit states from the current time t (M t−k ,M t−k+1 ,…,M t ), and compute the probability of this sequence. The higher the probability we get, the more likely the sequence of states come from the normal activities. A sequence of the states from the intrusive activities are expected to receive a low probability.
Two different measures to express the strength of anomalous signal are MC (mismatch count) and LFC (locality frame count) [17] .
3 Two-Layer Markov Chain Anomaly Detection Model
Audit data
In a two-layer Markov chain detection model, request, call name, and call return value are used to detect anomaly. The request can be the application supporting interactive requests/commands, and also can be command line parameters of the simple application which doesn't support the interactive request or command. The key is that each request can provide an independent and simple function. Request determines mostly the current function and call sequences. Not all call parameters are used, otherwise the number of states will become much huger.
In the two-layer Markov chains detection model, server process activity is viewed as being composed of a high-level requests/commands layer. Within each request section, a series of system calls are to perform the request function. The request often appears in read call. For example, "read(0,"PWD\r\n",1024)=5" denotes that FTPD receives a PWD request from a user. Using this characteristic can identify the request from the call trace and then partition the trace into the request sections.
The low layer is the call status series in each particular request. Each call status is composed of a call name and its return value: open is a failure. Therefore, only using call name for detection can raise the false alarm and false negation.
Two-Layer Markov chains
Most of the complicated server daemons such as FTPD, HTTPD, and SENDMAIL etc. directly support some requests/commands. For example, FTPD daemon has USER, PASS, PORT and QUIT etc. Traditional Markov detection model regards the server application call trace as a whole. Each request of an application can provide an independent and simple function so that constructing a Markov chain for each request can provide a more exact detection model. Our detection model can be regarded as two-layer Markov chains. The high layer is a request Markov chain, and the low layer is a request corresponding to the system call status Markov chain (see Fig.1 ).
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Profiling normal behavior
Profiling normal behaviors is to construct the transition probability matrix and initial probability distribution vector for each Markov chain from the normal trace data. To the high layer request Markov chain, the state is a request name. The size of the transition probability matrix requestP(p ij ) is requestNumΕrequestNum, and the size of the initial probability distribution vector requestQ(q i ) is requestNum. requestNum is the number of requests which appear in the normal training traces. To low-layer Markov chains, each request has a Markov chain. is the total number of callStatus which appears in request i corresponding to the call traces in the training traces.
The two-layer Markov chain model equates to the traditional Markov chain model in computing complexity of profiling normal behaviors, but the size of the needed memory to store parameters is greater than that of the traditional Markov chain model. Because each request performs an independent and simple function of the server daemon, our profiling method can describe more exactly the normal activities of the server daemon.
Anomaly detection
Measures to express the strength of anomalous signal can use MC or LFC in every Markov chain in a trace, and then use the maximum of MC or LFC values to determine anomaly. But we can also define another measure: AS 
Classification error
In IDS, there are two types of classification errors: false alarms (false positives) and false negatives. A false alarm occurs when a call trace generated by legitimate behavior is classified as anomalous, and a false negative occurs when a call trace generated by an intrusion is classified as normal.
In the two-layer Markov chains detection model, each Markov chain can choose different thresholds of the mismatch probability and state sequence length. Therefore our detection model can provide a higher anomaly detection rate and a lower false alarm than the tradition Markov chain anomaly detection model. , where p(s) denotes the probability of the sequence s.
In order to detect an intrusion trace I, at least one request or callStatus sequence generated by the intrusion must be classified as mismatch, i.e.
, the IDS will produce false negatives. To a normal trace N, none of the request or callStatus sequence generated by the normal activity should be classified as anomalous, i.e.
, the IDS will produce a false alarm.
Although we would like to minimize both kinds of the errors, we are more willing to tolerate false negatives than false positives. False negatives can be reduced by adding layers of defense, whereas layering will not reduce the overall false positive rates [6] . Therefore, to the given normal traces N, we can choose threshold ε i of the mismatch probability and state sequence length k i by and the toleration degree to false positives for 
, where is the minimal probability of length k request sequence in N and l is the minimal request sequence length of likely normal trace to ensure that every trace has at least one length k request sequence. Then choose ε by toleration degree to false positives. In a general way, the 
, where is the minimal probability of length k call status sequence in request r in N and l is the minimal call status sequence length of request r in N to ensure that each trace included in request r has at least one length k call status sequence. Then choose 
A wu-ftpd Detection Prototype and Experimental Result
On a Red Hat Linux system, we use Perl to implement a wu-ftpd daemon detection prototype. We use the wu-ftpd2.6.0 as an anomaly detection application, because wu-ftpd is a widely deployed software package to provide File Transfer Protocol (FTP) services on Unix and Linux systems, and exists many intrusion scripts on the Internet.
Training and testing trace data
We use command strace ("strace -p pid -f -o output.file") to get trace data. Strace is a system call trace, i.e. a debugging tool that prints out a trace of all the system calls made by another process. The program to be traced need not to be recompiled. Strace can also trace child processes, which are created by the currently traced processes as a result of the fork or vfork system call at the recent Linux kernel. Because Linux uses multi processes rather than multithreading to implement multitasking, we can use strace to trace multitasking. Each line in the trace contains the pid, system call name, followed by its arguments in parentheses and its return value. All of the training data are normal traces, while the testing data include both the normal traces and intrusion trace data. The data used in this study is described in Table 1 . The normal training trace data come from a live wu-ftpd daemon, with a careful checking by Snort [18] and other experts to keep no anomaly activity in normal training traces. The intrusion scripts are downloaded from Internet (http://www.hack.co.za and http://packetstormsecurity.nl) (in Table 2 ). In fact, only three scripts (bobek.c, wu-lnx.c and wuftpd2600.c) can triumphantly penetrate into system and get a root shell. 
Request recognization
In our prototype, the ftpd is managed by the inetd daemon. Wu-ftpd2.6.0 has 47 directional support requests, but in which 10 requests are not implemented. We add START and OTHER request into the request set. The START denotes the ftpd start process, and OTHER denotes the unidentifiable request. We use process ID to identify calls belonging to the same process in the trace data. The request can simply use "read (0,...)" to identify.
Learning wu-ftpd normal profile
The process of learning wu-ftpd normal profiles is to construct the transition probability matrix and initial probability distribution vector for each Markov chain from wu-ftpd training trace data. After learning, the total nonzero parameters in all of the probability state transaction matrixes are 1574; total nonzero parameters in all of the initial probability distribution vectors are 581. To the traditional Markov chain model, total nonzero parameters in the probability state transaction matrixes are 356; total nonzero parameters in the initial probability distribution vectors are 68.In each probability state transaction matrix, many values of items do not exist because the corresponding call transactions do not appear in the training trace data at all. Let these values of items be chosen as a little probability constant number 1e-5 according to 0.01.
How much is the normal training trace enough?
To build reasonable probability state transaction matrixes and initial probability distribution vectors of the Markov chains, how much are the training trace data needed? We use one training trace as one step; use subscript i to denote the parameters built from the previous i training trace data; use R to denote the request set, and let C denote the call status set. Then we apply the result values of the following equations to evaluate the probability state transaction matrixes and initial probability distribution vectors. The high layer Markov chain parameter requestP matrix and requestQ vector use the first and second equations respectively, while the low layer callStatusP and callStatusQ use the third and last equations respectively. Here, using request i (r 1, r 2 ) to denote the transaction probability from request r 1 to r 2 , and requestQ i (r) to denote the initial probability of request r; using callStatusP i (r,c 1 ,c 2 ) to denote the transaction probability from call status c 1 to c 2 in request r corresponding to the low layer Markov chain, and callStatusQ(r,c) to denote the initial probability of call status c in request r corresponding to the low layer Markov chain; function f(x) is to get the number of the nonzero items in matrix or vector x. The values are smaller; the parameters are more stabile and reasonable. If the parameters are stable enough, the training data are enough. During computing, the value of the item is regarded as zero if it does not appear after training. Using the training trace data, the results are described in Fig.2 . From Fig.2, we know our training trace data are enough to create the stable and reasonable Markov parameters. Fig.2 The changing of hdp, hdq, ldp and ldq
Finding ε and k
To the given normal training traces N (see Table 1 ), using the method in subsection 3.5, we choose the best parameter values of threshold of the mismatch probability and state sequence length for high layer request Markov chain and each low layer call status Markov chain. The threshold of mismatch probability is chosen to become zero false alarms for these normal training traces. We use 80 as the maximum length because the maximum of the minimum length of call status sequence in each request in training traces is 80, i.e. .
The results of the sequence length to each Markov chain are given in Table 3 (the threshold of mismatch probability is not given here). 
Comparison of detection performance comparing
We compare the detection performance of the two-layer Markov chain model with that of the traditional Markov chain model by ROC curve [13] . Each point in an ROC curve indicates a pair of the hit rate and the false alarm rate for a signal threshold. If an intrusive trace in the testing data is classified as anomaly, this is a hit. If a normal trace in the testing data is classified as anomaly, this is a false alarm. The hit rate is computed from the dividing of the total number of hits by the total number of intrusion traces in the testing data. The false alarm rate is computed from the dividing of the total number of false alarms by the total number of normal traces in the testing data. By varying the value of the signal threshold, we obtain an ROC curve. The closer the ROC is to the top-left corner (representing 100% hit rate and 0% false alarm rate) of the chart, the better the detection performance in the intrusion detection technique yields.
In Fig.3 , we provide three ROC curves. The ROC (1) is for the traditional Markov chain model, in which the sequence length is 17(the average value of sequence lengths in Table 3 ). The determination of anomaly or normal uses the LFC method, and the ROC curve is created by changing the sequence mismatch threshold value from 0 to 1. The ROC (2) is for the tow-layer Markov chain model, but in which each Markov chain uses the same sequence length 17 and sequence mismatch threshold as in ROC (1), determining anomaly or normal uses the LFC method as in ROC (1) too, and the ROC curve is created by changing the sequence mismatch threshold from 0 to 1. The ROC (3) is also for the tow-layer Markov chain model, in which each Markov chain uses the sequence length in Table 3 and corresponding to different sequence mismatch thresholds, determining anomaly or normal uses the AS method, and the ROC curve is created by changing the AS threshold value from 0 to1; For the LFC method in experiments, we arbitrarily choose 20 as a (reasonable) size for the locality frame, and take 10 mismatches in a local frame as the anomaly threshold. From Fig.3 , despite using the same sequence length, the LFC method and the method to create ROC, the detection performance of the two-layer Markov chain model is better than the traditional Markov chain model's. Using different sequence lengths, different sequence thresholds for each Markov and AS method, the two-layer Markov chain model can get the best detection performance. In experiment, we try other LFC frame lengths (30, 50 and100 etc.) and many others mismatch anomaly thresholds, but the results are similar to those of are not used to train the model at all. Therefore it is reasonable to expect that the two-layer Markov chain model is equally effective for detecting the really and truly new and unknown intrusions to those used in the experiments.
Discussion

Extensibilities
When following the following three steps, we can easily extend our model to protect other applications, especially for the privileged daemon processes such as SENDMAIL, HTTPD, POPD, LPD and NAMED etc. (1) Getting the application request set. For most daemon applications, this is easy. The key of request is simple and independent of the function. (2) Finding the way to identify request from the living system call trace. (3) Using our model frame to create the needed anomaly detection model. We can also use other anomaly detection techniques in our model, such as expert system, petri net, and neural network etc.
Strace command
When using the strace command to trace application, the application performance may lose about 100%− 200%. This is the main flaw of our detection model. An amelioration way can be the integration of the trace function into the operation system kernel. For Linux, it is a feasible way.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we present a new two-layer Markov chain anomaly detection model, a general framework for our model, and a wu-ftpd anomaly detection prototype.
The experimental results clearly demonstrate that the detection performance of the two-layer Markov chain detection model is better than the first Markov chain model's. Moreover our model can easily be extended to other applications and anomaly detection techniques. Using our detection model, the anomaly can be localized in the place where happens, i.e. it will be limited in the corresponding request sections, but not in the entire trace. For future work, we will use more call recorder information. We are also interested in extending our model to a mixed detection model (anomaly and pattern matching). We are currently pursuing these directions.
